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FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING AND THE 
LAW TODAY: THE BRAIN IS RELIABLE AS A MITIGATING 
FACTOR, BUT UNRELIABLE AS AN AGGRAVATING 
FACTOR OR AS A METHOD OF LIE DETECTION. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Charles Whitman was an exemplary individual; he was a husband 
and a son, an Eagle Scout, a scholarship student at the University of 
Texas, and he had just joined the United States Marine Corps. 1 Yet, 
on August 1, 1966, he brutally stabbed and murdered his wife and 
mother.2 Later that day, he ascended the University of Texas Tower 
and gunned down forty-five people, committing what was then the 
largest simultaneous mass murder in American history.3 In order to 
end the shooting spree, Austin police were forced to shoot and kill 
Whitman.4 In total, Charles Whitman savagely killed sixteen people 
and wounded thirty-one others.5 After this horrific event, 
investigators discovered a note written by Whitman in which he 
expressed confusion as to why he felt compelled to commit the 
murders and detailed the severe headaches and disturbing thoughts he 
had recently developed.6 An autopsy revealed a brain tumor in the 
hypothalamus region of Whitman's brain, which was compressing 
and over-stimulating the amygdala.7 Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) has since revealed that over-stimulation of the 
amygdala results in uncontrollable violent behavior and the inability 
of an individual to understand and appreciate criminal behavior. 8 
FMRI technology can help shed light on why individuals like Charles 
Whitman do what they do, and this raises the question of what role 
such evidence should play in the judicial system. 
1. Shelley Batts, Brain Lesions and Their Implications in Criminal Responsibility, 27 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261, 268 (2009). 
2. GARY M. LAVERGNE, A SNIPER IN THE TOWER: THE CHARLES WHITMAN MURDERS 103, 
105, 107-08 (1997). 
3. !d. at back cover. 
4. See Batts, supra note 1, at 268. 
5. !d. 
6. !d. 
7. !d. 
8. See id. at 268-69. 
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FMRI is a scientific technique used to image the brain's activity 
while an individual is engaging in a specific task or sensory process.9 
FMRI technology allows researchers to monitor the functioning of 
the brain by comparing the brain's consumption of oxygen in specific 
areas during movement, thought, sensation, and emotion. 10 Scientific 
research thus far has used fMRI for two main purposes: lie detection 
and the identification of functional or structural impairments within 
the brain. 11 
These scientific advances have raised many questions about the 
potential role of fMRI evidence in the legal system. 12 This comment 
will argue that fMRI as a method of distinguishing truth from 
falsehood is not yet reliable enough for use as substantive evidence in 
court, as the results are not consistent due to the variability and 
complexities in the brain patterns associated with different forms of 
lying. 13 However, fMRI evidence of increased violent and aggressive 
impulses, which result from impairment of the amygdala and 
prefrontal cortex regions of the brain, meets the "preponderance of 
the evidence" standard required for the admissibility of mitigation 
evidence during both federal and Maryland state sentencing 
proceedings, and, therefore, fMRI evidence should be considered by 
the court and the jury as a mitigating factor during sentencing. 14 But 
fMRI evidence does not meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard that is required for admission as an aggravating factor at this 
time. 15 
More importantly, this technology raises the larger concern as to 
what role fMRI should play in the law in the future when the 
technology evolves to the point where fMRI evidence can meet the 
9. See John C. Gore, Principles and Practice of Functional MRl of the Human Brain, 
112 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 4, 4 {2003). 
10. See Henry T. Greely, Neuroethics and ELSI: Similarities and Differences, 7 MINN. J. 
L. SCI. & TECH. 599, 612-13 (2006). , 
II. See Paul S. Appelbaum, The New Lie Detectors: Neuroscience, Deception, and the 
Courts, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 460, 461 (2007); John Matthew Fabian, 
Neuropsychological and Neurological Co"elates in Violent and Homicidal 
Offenders: A Legal and Neuroscience Perspective, 15 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT 
BEHAV. 209,211 (2010). 
12. See Appelbaum, supra note II, at 461. 
13. See id.; G. Ganis et al., Neural Co"elates of Different Types of Deception: AnjMRI 
Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 835 (2003); infra notes 53-69 and 
accompanying text. 
14. See Fabian, supra note II, at 217-19; infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text. See 
generally United States v. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2174 (2010) (holding that the 
standard for proving mitigating or aggravating factors at sentencing is a 
preponderance of the evidence standard). 
15. See infra notes 121-125. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for admission as an 
aggravating factor and, perhaps even more troubling, to the point 
where such fMRI evidence is reliable enough to meet the Daubert 
and Frye-Reed tests for admissibility as substantive evidence for the 
determination of guilt. 16 
II. FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 
A. The Principles 
The brain is a vastly complex organ; however, scientific research 
has revealed that specific areas of the brain are associated with 
distinct cognitive and behavioral functions. 17 For example, the motor 
and pre-motor cortices regulate movement of body parts; the Broca's 
and Wernicke's areas regulate understanding and production of 
speech; the prefrontal cortex translates sensory and non-sensory input 
into information used to make decisions and choices; and the 
amygdala regulates perception of and responses to emotional 
stimuli. 18 Each function is associated with specific patterns of 
neuronal firing and activation, such that an increase in neuronal 
activity in a given area of the brain represents an increase in the 
cognitive or behavioral function of that region. 19 
Neurons obtain the energy needed for firing and activation from the 
oxygenated blood that is transported to the brain in response to a 
stimulus or event.20 Oxygenated blood behaves differently than 
deoxygenated blood in magnetic fields, and this enables fMRI to 
measure changes in neuronal activity within different areas of the 
brain.21 FMRI detects the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
response, based on the influx of oxygenated blood to a specific area 
16. See Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 461--62; infra Part IV. 
1 7. Batts, supra note 1, at 265. 
18. See id. at 265--69. 
19. See Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional 
Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. 
REv. 1119,1138 (2010). 
20. See id. 
21. See Gore, supra note 9, at 4. Deoxygenated hemoglobin is paramagnetic, similar to 
the contrast agents used in conventional MRI scans. !d. This results in a lack of 
uniformity that causes the magnetic field and BOLD response signal to deteriorate 
faster. See id. On the other hand, oxygenated hemoglobin is similar in its magnetic 
properties to tissue and so a stronger, more uniform BOLD response signal results. 
See id. 
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of the brain.22 A positive BOLD response will result where there is a 
net increase in the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated blood. 23 
Thus, a positive BOLD response indicates increased activity in that 
particular area of the brain.24 Conversely, a negative BOLD response 
results where there is a net decrease in the ratio of oxygenated to 
deoxygenated blood, and indicates a decrease in activity in that 
specific area of the brain. 25 
B. The Procedure 
When undergoing an fMRI scan, the subject must lie down on his 
or her back on a narrow bed.26 The bed and the subject are then 
inserted into the center of a cylindrical tube with a magnetic core.27 
The subject is instructed to lie as still as possible, but, if the subject is 
unable to do so, his or her head may be placed in a headrest to ensure 
there is no movement of the brain.28 Once the subject is in place, 
strong magnetic coils measure electrical currents in the form of 
BOLD responses within the subject's brain.29 Depending on the 
research question, various audio or visual stimuli may be 
administered during the scan, or the subject may be asked to perform 
tasks or select buttons corresponding to different answers on a small 
remote control device, while continuing to remain as still as 
possible.30 The technology of the fMRI machine allows for cross-
sectional images of the subject's brain to be taken every 50 to 100 
milliseconds throughout the duration of the scan.31 This is 
advantageous because it allows for multiple recordings of the brain's 
22. See id. An increase in the level and intensity of brain activity occurring in a particular 
region will result in an increased flow of oxygenated blood to the area. I d. 
23. See id.; Brown & Murphy, supra note 19, at 1139. 
24. See Gore, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
25. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 19, at 1139. 
26. United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074M1/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. 
June 1, 2010). 
27. See id. 
28. Brown & Murphy, supra note 19, at 1139; see also Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *3. 
29. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 19, at 1139. There are two main types of fMRI 
studies that can be performed: block designs, where different stimuli are presented in 
alternating periods of several seconds each and then compared to one another for an 
average result, and transient stimuli, which are more event-related. See Gore, supra 
note 9, at 5-6. 
30. Brown & Murphy, supra note 19, at 1139. 
31. Gore, supra note 9, at 5. The cross-sections are recorded so quickly that images 
within the same brain state may differ from one another due to extraneous "noise" 
from voltage in the magnetic coils or components used to record the fMRI signals. Jd. 
However, the images do not suffer blurring from physiological motion, which can be 
a concern with other forms of scans. I d. 
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response to each repeated stimuli.32 The data sets of BOLD response 
recordings are then compared and averaged in order to increase the 
reliability of the measured BOLD response. 33 A computer algorithm 
quantitatively analyzes the data in order to complete this comparison 
and averaging of the data sets.34 The measured BOLD responses are 
then compared to the subject's control BOLD responses in order to 
identify changes in the intensity of the signals and, thus, the 
corresponding changes in activity in specific areas of the subject's 
brain.35 
C. The Concerns 
It is important to note, however, that there are limitations 
associated with tMRI technology.36 The BOLD responses can be 
hard to measure because they are very small, typically around a 1% 
change in neural activity.37 Furthermore, variations in other blood 
components, such as the subject's levels of glucose or caffeine, are 
also likely to affect the BOLD response, yet the effects of such 
variations are not well understood.38 Finally, an impaired blood 
supply to the brain may also affect the magnitude of the BOLD 
response.39 Despite these limitations, tMRI techniques can measure 
subtle changes in the state of the brain in order to map brain 
functions.40 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. 
35. United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. 
June 1, 2010). Each subject undergoes the fMRI procedure two times: the first time 
obtains baseline, control responses; the second time measures the subject's responses 
to the various stimuli. 
36. See Gore, supra note 9, at 8. 
37. See id. at 4-5, 8. 
38. !d. at 9. 
39. See id. 
40. !d. 
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III. FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING AND 
THE LAW 
A. Admissibility of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging as 
Substantive Evidence 
1. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging as Evidence of 
Deception 
Recent scientific studies have used fMRI technology as a lie 
detection tool to distinguish truthful from untruthful responses.41 
This application is based on research suggesting that different 
patterns of activity within the brain result when someone is telling the 
truth versus when someone is telling a lie.42 In general, lying results 
in increased brain activity, because the brain is working to suppress 
an otherwise truthful response in favor of a fabrication. 43 
One such fMRI study found that "distinct neural networks support 
different types of deception."44 The study focused on two specific 
types oflies: spontaneous-isolated lies and memorized-scenario lies.45 
To tell a spontaneous-isolated lie, an individual must keep the truth in 
mind while generating alternative lies in order to select among 
them.46 This process involves both semantic and episodic memory, 
which are associated with the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the 
anterior prefrontal cortex respectively.47 On the other hand, 
memorized-scenario lies require the individual to recall only a 
specific lie, and thus only episodic memory is involved.48 The results 
of the study confirmed that not only is there an increase in brain 
activity when an individual is lying, but that there are different 
patterns of brain activity for different types oflies.49 
While this study is consistent with two of the three previous fMRI 
research studies related to lie detection, it is inconsistent with the 
third study, which showed activation in a different area of the brain 
41. Appelbaum, supra note II, at 461. 
42. /d. 
43. /d. 
44. Ganis et al., supra note 13, at 830. 
45. !d. at 831. 
46. !d. 
4 7. !d. Semantic memory refers to an individual thinking of all plausible responses to the 
question, whereas episodic memory refers to an individual thinking of a specific 
event. !d. Spontaneous-isolated lies may also involve activation in the ventral stream 
regions "if these retrieval systems are also accompanied by visual imagery." !d. 
48. /d. at 831. 
49. !d. at 833. Block design fMRI testing was used in this study, and subjects were 
required to provide either binary button or single word responses. !d. at 832. 
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for spontaneous-isolated lies.50 This is concerning because the 
majority of fMRI research thus far has been based on group analysis, 
and if data is not consistent with regard to which brain areas show 
increased activity during forms of deception, there can be no 
individualized, real-world applications of the fMRI technique.51 
Furthermore, partial truths and truths after contemplation of lying 
have yet to be studied, and these forms of lies are likely common in 
human behavior. 52 
2. Analysis for Admissibility of Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging as Evidence of Deception Under Daubert 
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence superseded Frye's "general acceptance" test for 
admissibility of scientific evidence, rejecting the Frye test in favor of 
the Daubert test. 53 The touchstone for the Daubert test is the 
reliability of the scientific evidence. 54 The Court held that the 
standard for determining reliability is a multi-factor analysis 
considering whether the technique can be or has been tested, whether 
the technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, the 
known or potential rate of error of the technique, and whether the 
technique has been generally accepted by the scientific community.55 
The Daubert test is flexible and the factors are tailored to the specific 
facts of the case, as opposed to being viewed as a definitive 
checklist. 56 
The first two factors of the Daubert test have been satisfied by 
research in the scientific community utilizing fMRI as a tool to detect 
deception: fMRI has been and can continue to be subjected to testing, 
and fMRI has been and can continue to be subjected to peer review 
and publication.57 Nevertheless, fMRI is unreliable as a method of 
50. /d. at 835. Researchers attribute the difference in the brain activation for the 
spontaneous-isolated lies to the use of different block stimuli. See id. 
51. See Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 461. "Even if group norms of liars and truth-tellers 
differ in a particular study, unless specific brain regions are consistently associated 
with deception it will be difficult to apply these findings to the assessment of 
truthfulness among particular individuals." /d. 
52. See id. 
53. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585, 587-90 (1993). 
54. /d. at 589. 
55. !d. at 593-94. 
56. /d. at 593. 
57. United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074M1/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10 (W.D. Tenn. 
June 1, 2010); see, e.g., Batts, supra note 1; Appelbaum, supra note 11; Fabian, supra 
note 11; Garris eta!., supra note 13. 
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detecting deception. 58 The error rate of fMRI studies for this purpose 
remains unknown, and there has been no real-life or real-world 
application of the technique.59 Additionally, researchers 
acknowledge that the various studies utilizing fMRI to detect lies 
have produced inconsistent results, as different studies show different 
areas of increased activation within the brain as a result of 
deception.60 Accordingly, the scientific community has yet to 
generally accept fMRI-based lie detection as a valid tool to separate 
truth from falsehood. 61 Therefore, admissibility of fMRI as a lie-
detection method fails the Daubert test of admissibility.62 
3. Analysis for Admissibility of Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging as Evidence of Deception Under Frye-Reed 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, in Frye v. United 
States, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that 
scientific techniques or theories "must be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which [they] 
belong" in order to be admissible in evidence.63 The Maryland Court 
of Appeals adopted this test in Reed v. State, 64 and Maryland 
continues to adhere to the Frye general acceptance standard. 65 Thus, 
under Maryland law, if a technique is generally regarded as 
experimental within the scientific community, the technique is not 
reliable, and cannot be admitted into evidence. 66 
The technique of fMRI lie detection fails the general acceptance 
test, because disagreement exists among researchers as to the specific 
brain areas of increased activity when a person is being deceptive.67 
Furthermore, some neuroscientists doubt the real-world applicability 
of fMRI lie detection because in all of the studies thus far, subjects 
have been instructed to lie, and it is quite clear that this would not be 
58. Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10. 
59. !d. at *II, *13. 
60. See Appelbaum, supra note II, at 462; Ganis eta!., supra note 13, at 835. 
61. Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *13. 
62. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
63. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
64. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (1978). 
65. Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 349 n.7, 896 A.2d 1059, 1065 n.7 (2006) (holding 
that Maryland has not yet accepted the Daubert test). 
66. Reed, 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368. 
67. Appelbaum, supra note II, at 461; see also Reed, 283 Md. at 388, 391 A.2d at 371 
(holding that if a scientific technique has achieved general acceptance in the scientific 
community, there will be little disagreement in the field as to the reliability of the 
technique's results). 
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the case in the real world.68 Without consistency and general 
acceptance of fMRI lie detection studies, the results of such studies 
should not be admitted as substantive evidence in any court 
proceeding. 69 
B. Admissibility of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
During Sentencing 
1. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging as Evidence of 
Increased Violence and Aggression Resulting from Damage to 
the Amygdala and Prefrontal Cortex Regions of the Brain 
Neurological research has linked functional and structural 
impairments of the brain to increased violence and aggression. 70 The 
prefrontal cortex and the amygdala are critical performance centers in 
the brain's system that grasp, organize, and categorize stimuli in 
order to regulate emotion.71 The amygdala enhances perception and 
memory of emotional stimuli by mediating between the limbic 
system, which regulates emotions and behavior, and the structures 
involved in memory processing.72 
FMRI has confirmed that the medial amygdala exerts inhibitory 
· influences, whereas the lateral amygdala exerts excitatory 
influences.73 In essence, the amygdala can directly inhibit or excite 
anger, aggression, memory and language impairment, responses to 
emotional stimuli, the "fight or flight" response system, and 
behavior.74 Furthermore, fMRI has confirmed that the prefrontal 
cortex directly regulates both an individual's ability to make choices 
and decisions related to the exertion of self-control, and the ability to 
perceive and act normally by processing input from sensory and non-
sensory areas of the brain, including the amygdala. 75 The prefrontal 
cortex has also been linked to an individual's ability to understand 
68. See Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent 
Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 403-04 (2007) (distinguishing the 
artificial environment of the laboratory from the real world when discussing the real-
world application of fMRllie detection). 
69. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
70. Fabian, supra note 11, at 211; see also Batts, supra note 1, at 268 (discussing the 
effects of increased stimulation in the amygdala). 
71. Theodore Y. Blurnoff, Foreword: The Brain Sciences and Criminal Law Norms, 62 
MERCERL.REv. 705, 737(2011). 
72. Batts, supra note 1, at 269. 
73. Id. 
74. See id.; Fabian, supra note 11, at 212-13. 
75. See Batts, supra note 1, at 268-69. 
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and process information, reason, control impulses, use knowledge to 
regulate behavior, understand and respond to the actions of others, 
empathize, and manipulate stored information in order to make 
decisions. 76 
The interplay between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex 
directly impacts an individual's free will and decision making 
abilities.77 The amygdala immediately interprets emotional 
stimulations and transmits them through the neural system to the 
prefrontal cortex, which processes the input, allowing time for 
thought, reason, and conscious awareness before action is taken.78 
Thus, it is only when these two neural circuits are operating properly, 
both independently and dependently, that an individual is afforded 
the ability to reflect, reason, and act with a conscious and willful 
purpose.79 
In order to understand how deficiencies and malformations in the 
amygdala and prefrontal cortex of the brain affect an individual's 
aggressive and violent behavior, one must understand that aggression 
ranges from predisposed predatory behavior to defensive behavior.80 
Individuals with a predisposition to violence and aggression act with 
purpose, and their rage is often channeled into a premeditated violent 
act that is used to achieve a certain objective.81 On the other hand, 
defensively violent and aggressive individuals respond to a stressful 
and threatening situation in an attempt to reduce the threat, and "the 
violence is immediate, impulsive, emotional and reactive rather than 
planned and premeditated."82 Reactive aggression is associated with 
the amygdala, while calculated aggression is associated with the 
prefrontal cortex. 83 
76. Fabian, supra note 11, at 212. 
77. /d. at 216. 
78. See id. at 216-17; Batts, supra note 1, at 268-69. The amygdala is also involved in 
learning which behavior is the correct behavior to use in order to achieve a goal or a 
reward because the amygdala provides a reward signal after engaging in the reactive 
behavior. Fabian, supra note 11, at 211. If an individual's amygdala produces a 
reward signal after the individual engages in violent, aggressive behavior, the 
individual will be more likely to engage in that form of behavior in the future in order 
to achieve a goal or reward. /d. The prefrontal cortex plays an important role in 
regulating the reward signals of the amygdala in order to delay "immediate 
gratification in order to achieve a more rational or eventually more rewarding long-
term goal." See Batts, supra note 1, at 268. 
79. Fabian, supra note 11, at 217. 
80. See id. at 210. 
81. See id. at 21 0-11. 
82. !d. at 211. 
83. See id. 
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FMRI neuroimaging data shows that a damaged amygdala can lead 
to an inability to properly respond and adapt to fear and form 
stimulus-punishment associations.84 More specifically, a damaged 
amygdala impairs an individual's ability to accurately perceive 
emotional stimuli and, when the amygdala is over-stimulated, results 
in increased feelings of fear and aggression.85 Furthermore, fMRI has 
shown that when the prefrontal cortex is damaged, not all available 
information related to the decision-making process can be utilized 
and considered during decision making. 86 This can result in an 
individual acting without realizing or understanding that their 
behavior is wrong or criminal.87 Correlative research studies have 
shown "that damage or dysfunction [within] the prefrontal cortex 
[results in] a significant predisposition to antisocial and violent 
behavior."88 This is because individuals with damaged prefrontal 
cortices cannot properly inhibit the amygdala subcortical emotional 
center, and thus they are biologically vulnerable to impulsive 
violence and aggression because they cannot properly anticipate 
future consequences of their actions. 89 
2. Mitigation and Sentencing 
"It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition 
for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an 
individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that 
sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the 
punishment to ensue."90 In order for courts to properly sentence an 
individual for the crime committed, the courts must have all the 
information they can obtain concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics.91 
84. See id. at 213. 
85. See Batts, supra note I, at 268-69. 
86. !d. at 268. 
87. !d. 
88. Fabian, supra note II, at 211. Both reduction in prefrontal cortical size and decreased 
prefrontal cortical activity is associated with increased violence and aggression. !d. 
Evidence shows that the most significant form of aggression associated with 
prefrontal injuries or malformations is reactive, impulsive aggression as opposed to 
predatory, premeditated aggression. See id. 
89. !d. at 211-12. 
90. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996); see also Williams v. New York, 337 
U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (holding that "the punishment should fit the offender and not 
merely the crime" (citing People v. Johnson, 169 N.E. 619, 621 (N.Y. 1930))). 
91. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011) (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 
247). 
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Congress has codified this principle in Title 18, Section 3661 of the 
United States Code, which states, "no limitation shall be placed on 
the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of 
a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States 
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence. "92 Therefore, sentencing courts are largely unlimited in 
both the kind of information they may consider and the source of the 
information. 93 
It is also well settled in Maryland state courts that during 
sentencing, the court may consider a broad range of evidence, 
including mitigating factors such as: 
[T]he murder was committed while the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's 
conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of 
law was substantially impaired due to emotional 
disturbance, mental disorder, or mental incapacity; . . . [or] 
any other fact that the court or jury specifically sets forth in 
writing as a mitigating circumstance in the case.94 
The defendant has the burden of raising any mitigating factors to be 
considered during sentencing.95 The standard of proof for such 
mitigating factors, in both federal and Maryland state court, is a 
preponderance of the evidence.96 "To prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence means to prove that something is more likely ... than 
not .... "97 If the court or the jury finds that mitigating circumstances 
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006) (emphasis added). 
93. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). 
94. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h)(2)(iv), (viii) (LexisNexis 2012) (emphasis 
added). The sentencing court may also consider mitigating factors such as: 
[T]he victim was a participant . . . or consented to the act that 
caused the victim's death; the defendant acted under substantial 
duress, domination, or provocation ... ; the defendant was of a 
youthful age . . . ; the act of the defendant was not the sole 
proximate cause ... ; and it is unlikely that the defendant will 
engage in further criminal activity that would be a continuing 
threat to society. 
/d. § 2-303(h)(2). 
95. Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 126, 472 A.2d 953, 972 (1984). 
96. Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331,361,473 A.2d 903,918 (1984) (holding that it is the 
accused's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a 
mitigating circumstance); see also United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 570 (4th Cir. 
2009) (holding that a sentencing court is obligated to make factual determinations by 
a preponderance of the evidence). 
97. Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 170, 729 A.2d 910, 930 ( 1999). 
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exist, then the court or 
preponderance of the 
circumstances outweigh 
determining the sentence.98 
the jury must determine, also by a 
evidence, whether any aggravating 
the mitigating circumstances when 
3. Analysis of Admissibility of Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Evidence of Brain Impairment or Malformation as a 
Mitigating Factor During Sentencing Under a Preponderance of 
the Evidence Standard 
The criminal law is based on the premise that mental states have an 
effect on the determination of the appropriate punishment.99 Federal 
law and Maryland state law make it clear that the court must consider 
all possible information concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics, without limitation, in order to determine an 
appropriate sentence for both the individual and the crime. 100 
Mitigating factors explicitly allow a judge or jury to consider whether 
the crime was committed while the defendant was unable to 
appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to 
the requirements of law due to mental disorder or mental 
incapacity. 101 As such, fMRI evidence providing insight into the 
biological causes of a defendant's increased aggression and violence 
or decreased ability to perceive and understand the culpability and 
criminality of his or her actions should be admissible as a mitigating 
factor during sentencing proceedings. 102 
While it is true that the existence of mitigating factors must be 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, 103 correlative fMRI 
research has shown that individuals known to have increased violent 
and aggressive behavioral tendencies will more likely than not show 
increased brain activity in the amygdala and decreased brain activity 
in the prefrontal cortex. 104 Thus, a defendant should be allowed to 
98. MD. CRIM. LAW§ 2-303(i)(1). 
99. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 576-79,632 A.2d 797, 800-01 (1993). 
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006); Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011); 
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). 
101. MD. CRIM. LAW§ 2-303(h)(2)(iv). 
102. See Batts, supra note 1, at 264, 269; cf 18 U.S.C. § 3661 ("Use of information for 
sentencing"); MD. CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h)(2)(iv) ("Consideration of mitigating 
circumstances."). 
1 03. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
104. Mairead C. Dolan, What Imaging Tells Us About Violence in Anti-Social Men, 20 
CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 199, 207--()8 (2010) (citing studies that prove 
individuals prone to reactive aggression have exaggerated amygdala responses and 
attenuated prefrontal activation during performance of an inhibition task, as compared 
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introduce evidence of fMRI scans of his or her brain activity. 105 
Showing increased activation of the amygdala or decreased activity 
of the prefrontal cortex is appropriate for consideration as a 
mitigating factor106 because such biological impairments are a 
characteristic of the defendant and play a direct role in the inability of 
the defendant to comprehend the criminality of his or her actions. 107 
The mental state of the defendant must be considered to ensure the 
punishment for the crime is tailored to the individual. 108 
4. Risks Associated With Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Evidence of Brain Impairment or Malformation as a 
Mitigating Factor During Sentencing 
There are, however, some risks associated with use of fMRI 
evidence as a mitigating factor. 109 One such concern is the human 
error and subjectivity or bias associated with the analysis of the brain 
images.110 Although scientists, technicians, and clinicians choose 
which technique to use, 111 some subjectivity and bias is eliminated 
because very precise computer algorithms quantitatively analyze the 
fMRI data. 112 This results in a more accurate determination of 
whether the defendant's brain is structurally and functionally 
impaired. 113 Furthermore, this method of analysis permits a 
comparison of the defendant's brain to a database of fMRI data from 
brains with known abnormalities. 114 
to individuals with healthy controls); see also Adrian Raine et a!., Reduced Right 
Hemisphere Activation in Severely Abused Violent Offenders During a Working 
Memory Task: An jMRl study, 27 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 111, 124 (2001) ("Seriously 
violent individuals who have suffered severe physical abuse as children show reduced 
functioning ... [in] the right temporal cortex[.]"). 
105. See Dolan, supra note 104, at 207-08; Raine et a!., supra note 104, at 124; cf 18 
U.S.C. § 3661 (discussing the "use of information for sentencing"). 
106. Cf Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 170, 729 A.2d 910, 930 (1999) (suggesting that 
anything about the defendant or the facts of the case should be considered as a 
mitigating circumstance out of fairness or mercy to the defendant in sentencing). 
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; Conyers, 354 Md. at 170, 729 A.2d at 930. 
108. See supra Part III.B.I-2. 
109. See generally John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: 
The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Defense's Use of Neuroimages in Capital 
Cases -Lessons From the Front, 62 MERCER L. REv. 909 (2011) (discussing the 
considerations that need to be made when neuroimaging is used in a capital case). 
110. !d. at 925. 
Ill. See Joseph H. Baskin eta!., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in 
the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239, 249 (2007). 
112. See Gore, supra note 9, at 925. 
113. Blume & Paavola, supra note 109, at 914. 
114. !d. 
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Another concern regarding the use of fMRI evidence is its effect on 
judicial and juror decision making. 115 Unless the fMRI results, and 
the behavioral and clinical significance of those results, are clearly 
explained so that judges and laypersons on the jury can understand 
the implications for the defendant in terms of the crime committed, 
then judges or jurors may give improper weight to the fMRI 
evidence. 116 
5. Aggravation and Sentencing 
The consideration of aggravating factors also allows the court to 
individualize the defendant's sentence in order "to fit the 'offender, 
and not merely the crime."'117 The court may consider various 
factors, including the defendant's attitude at trial,118 "reputation, ... 
health, habits, [and] mental and moral propensities."119 It is also well 
settled in both federal and Maryland state courts that the State has the 
burden of raising any aggravating factors to be considered during 
sentencing, and the standard of proof for such aggravating factors is 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 120 
6. Analysis of Admissibility of Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Evidence of Brain Impairment or Malformation as an 
Aggravating Factor During Sentencing Under a Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt Standard 
Mental states have an effect on the determination of the appropriate 
punishment for a crime. 121 However, the existence of aggravating 
115. See id. at 927. 
116. See id. One research study introduced fMRI evidence to a mock jury in order to see 
how such evidence would affect decision making. Fabian, supra note 11, at 219. The 
results of the study concluded that jurors are 15% more likely to fmd a defendant not · 
guilty by reason of insanity when such a plea is accompanied by a brain imaging. /d. 
It is important to note, however, that this study involved admission of fMRI as 
substantive evidence during the guilt phase. See id. Risk of an improper acquittal is 
not present when fMRI evidence is introduced only as a mitigating factor during 
sentencing. 
117. Jennings v. State, 339 Md. 675, 683, 664 A.2d 903, 907 (1995) (quoting Smith v. 
State, 308 Md. 162, 167, 517 A.2d 1081, 1084 (1986)). 
118. /d. at 688, 664 A.2d at 910; Saenz v. State, 94 Md. App. 238, 250-51, 620 A.2d 725, 
736 (1993). 
119. Colvin-e1 v. State, 332 Md. 144, 166, 630 A.2d 725, 736 (1993) (quoting Huffington 
v. State, 304 Md. 559, 577, 500 A.2d 272, 281 (1985). 
120. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)(2006); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g)(1) (LexisNexis 
2012). 
121. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 577-87, 632 A.2d 797, 800-01 (1993). 
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factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order for them 
to be taken into consideration during sentencing. 122 Correlative tMRI 
research has shown that individuals known to have increased violent 
and aggressive behavioral traits show increased brain activity in the 
amygdala and decreased brain activity in the prefrontal cortex and are 
more likely than not unable to control their behavior or appreciate the 
criminality of their actions. 123 But the fMRI research results are not 
yet equivalent to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for 
the escalation or enhancement of the defendant's punishment. 124 The 
concerns regarding the difficulty in measuring the BOLD responses 
and the effect of variations of blood components on the BOLD 
responses prohibit this technology from meeting the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard required for admission as an aggravating 
factor. 125 
IV. THE BIGGER QUESTION MOVING FORWARD: WHAT 
ROLE WILL FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE 
IMAGING PLAY IN THE FUTURE AS TECHNOLOGY 
ADVANCES? 
A. The Fabric of the Criminal Law 
The criminal law is based on the premise that there are two 
components to every crime: the actus reus, the forbidden criminal 
act, and the mens rea, the guilty mind or intent accompanying the 
criminal act. 126 Thus, the mental state of the defendant relates 
directly to the criminal culpability of the defendant, and to the 
determination of the appropriate punishment to fit both the defendant 
and the crime. 127 Identifying the defendant's state of mind, however, 
is a difficult task. 128 Currently, courts must rely on objective 
circumstances surrounding the conduct of the defendant in order to 
infer the defendant's state ofmind.129 In the near future, however, as 
technology advances and research continues, tMRI technology 
should reach a point where it can be used to identify the defendant's 
mental state at the time of committing the crime. 13° For this reason, it 
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); MD. CRIM. LAW§ 2-303(g)(1). 
123. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; supra Part III.B.l. 
124. See supra Part II. C. 
125. See supra Part II.C. 
126. Garnett, 332 Md. at 577-78, 632 A.2d at 800. 
127. See id. at 577-79, 632 A.2d at 800-01. 
128. Brown & Murphy, supra note 19, at 1130. 
129. /d. 
130. See Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 461-62. 
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is important for judges, lawyers, neuroscientists, and lawmakers to 
consider the concerns raised by the potential use of such fMRI 
evidence, and what role fMRI evidence will play in the law in the 
future. 131 
B. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging as an Aggravating 
Factor or as Substantive Evidence for Determining Guilt 
FMRI technology and research have evolved to the point where 
evidence of increased activation of the amygdala or decreased 
activity of the prefrontal cortex proves, more likely than not, that an 
individual is predisposed to aggressive or violent behavior and that 
the individual has a decreased ability to perceive and understand the 
culpability and criminality of his or her actions. 132 Thus, the use of 
such fMRI evidence as a mitigating factor, which requires only a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, is consistent with the fabric 
of the criminal law that states that if a defendant lacks the mental 
capacity to conform his or her conduct to the law then the defendant's 
sentence should be mitigated. 133 
However, when fMRI technology evolves to the point where it can 
prove an individual's mental state beyond a reasonable doubt, the use 
of fMRI evidence seems to pose significant problems for the 
principles of criminal law and the criminal justice system. 134 The use 
of fMRI evidence as an aggravating factor may be at odds with the 
legal principle that justifies aggravating factors, because an 
individual cannot control or change the functioning of his or her 
brain. 135 It does not seem just or fair to increase the punishment of a 
defendant who can neither control his or her actions nor appreciate 
the criminality of his or her behavior. Furthermore, the use of fMRI 
evidence to determine guilt or innocence seems to raise fundamental 
questions as to the very definitions of guilt and innocence, as 
biological impairment has a direct impact on the legal concept of 
responsibility. 136 If an individual cannot appreciate the fact that 
engaging in certain conduct is wrong or criminal, then the individual 
cannot form the requisite mens rea necessary for conviction of the 
crime committed, and this suggests that the individual is not guilty of 
the crime, despite the fact that the actus reus is unquestionably 
131. See id. 
132. See supra Part ID.B.3. 
133. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW§ 2-303(h)(2) (LexisNexis 2012). 
134. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 19, at 1132. 
135. See, e.g., Batts, supra note 1, at 264-65. 
136. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 19, at 1134-35. 
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present. 137 The use of such evidence also poses a concern because if 
two individuals commit the very same crime, is it just to punish only 
one of them if fMRI evidence shows that the other has an improperly 
functioning brain? Such concerns should be addressed through 
policy and the development of a legal framework before technology 
inevitably advances, "rather than through the adjudication of specific 
cases relying on individualized facts." 138 
V. CONCLUSION 
FMRI as a method of distinguishing truth from falsehood does not 
meet either the Daubert multi-factor analysis or the Frye general 
acceptance standard for use as substantive evidence in court. 139 
FMRI evidence of lie detection fails these standards for admissibility 
because the research results from group-based studies are not yet 
consistent enough to make individualized determinations of truth 
versus falsehood, due to the variability and complexities involved in 
the brain patterns associated with different forms of lying. 140 With 
continued scientific research, however, fMRI evidence of deception 
will meet the Daubert and Frye standards for admission in the 
future.l41 
FMRI evidence of increased violence and aggression resulting from 
functional impairment of the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex 
region of the brain, however, meets the preponderance of the 
evidence standard required for the admissibility of evidence during a 
sentencing proceeding. 142 Therefore, the court and the jury should 
consider fMRI evidence as a mitigating factor during sentencing, as 
long as such evidence is viewed with caution and presented in such a 
manner that a layperson can clearly understand the clinical findings 
and the corresponding behavioral implications for the defendant in 
terms of his or her criminal culpability. 143 It is important to note, 
however, that such fMRI evidence does not meet the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard that is required for admission as an 
aggravating factor. 144 
As science advances, however, fMRI technology should evolve to 
the point where such evidence can meet the beyond a reasonable 
137. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 577-78, 632 A.2d 797, 800 (1993). 
138. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 129, at 1135. 
139. See supra Part III.A.2-3. 
140. See supra Part III.A.2-3. 
141. See Appelbaum, supra note II, at 461. 
142. See supra Part III.B.3. 
143. See supra Part lli.B.3; supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra Part lli.B.6. 
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doubt standard required for admission as an aggravating factor and, 
perhaps even more troubling, to the point where such fMRI evidence 
is reliable enough to meet the Daubert and Frye-Reed tests for 
admissibility as substantive evidence for the determination of guilt. 145 
For this reason, courts should anticipate encountering such fMRI 
brain evidence sooner rather than later so that when the fMRI 
technology advances, the groundwork for the use of fMRI evidence 
in the legal system has already been laid. 146 
145. 
146. 
• 
See Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 461--62. 
See id. 
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